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Abstract
The Kennedy administration decided on and carried out Project Apollo to defeat
the Soviet Union in the moon race, while it also strived to realize U.S.-Soviet joint
human lunar exploration in addition to their negotiations about space science
cooperation. This article examines the change of the two aspects of Project Apollo,
competition and cooperation with the Soviet Union, during one thousand days of
the Kennedy administration from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy in the Cold
War. The Kennedy administration chose Project Apollo as a crucial national policy
that would bear part of the U.S. foreign policy, and advanced it by laying emphasis
on competition or cooperation in accordance with the change of U.S.-Soviet
relations. The purpose of Project Apollo was not only the display of U.S. power and
ideas but also the relaxation of the tensions in the Cold War. The space policy of
the Kennedy administration, with Project Apollo as the central program, restored
gradually the U.S. international status of those days, and contributed to the opening
of the peaceful coexistence in the 1960s with other foreign policies of the
administration.
Introduction
It has been about forty years since Americans first landed on the surface of the
moon. Surprisingly enough, this first lunar landing might have been accomplished
as a U.S.-Soviet joint project. It is true that the Kennedy administration decided to
go to the moon so as to defeat the Soviet Union in the next space race just after the
Soviet first human spaceflight. However, the Kennedy administration also strived to
realize U.S.-Soviet joint human lunar exploration, advocating international
cooperation in space activities. The concrete plan for cooperation was about to be
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brought up to the Soviet Union when President Kennedy was assassinated in
November 1963.
The two aspects of Project Apollo, competition and cooperation with the Soviet
Union, have been examined by making use of the materials declassified especially
after the end of the Cold War.1)  But it has not yet been fully explained how and
why the two aspects had changed during one thousand days of the Kennedy
administration. Besides, some important documents about the top-level space policy
decisions of those days have been unveiled in recent years.
With the awareness of the issues, this article examines historically how the
Kennedy administration decided on and carried out Project Apollo in the Cold War,
paying attention to the relationship between the space policy and the foreign policy
of the Kennedy administration.
First, this article considers why John F. Kennedy explored a cooperation-
oriented space policy in the first months of his administration, although he had
asserted in the presidential election that the United States should win space
competition with the Soviet Union. Next, it reviews why the Kennedy
administration decided to go to the moon in April-May 1961. Then, it examines
why Kennedy proposed U.S.-Soviet joint lunar exploration both in the Vienna
summit meeting of June 1961 and in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly of
September 1963, while the administration was putting forth serious efforts to
implement Project Apollo. Finally, this article summarizes the transition of the two
aspects of Project Apollo and discusses the purpose and meaning of Project Apollo
as the space policy of the Kennedy administration in the Cold War.
The Birth of the Kennedy Administration
The origin of the space policy of the Kennedy administration can be traced back
to the “Sputnik shock” in the fall of 1957. Two Democratic Senators severely
blamed the then Eisenhower Republican administration for causing the shock,
though many Senators and others did the same thing more or less. Those were John
F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.
The Soviet Union succeeded in the launch of the first artificial satellite Sputnik 1
on 4 October 1957, following the first inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) in
August of the same year. It was a great shock to people in western countries who
believed the U.S. superiority over the Soviet Union. In the United States, this shock
led to the disputes over the twin gaps, the “missile gap” in nuclear capability and
the “space gap” in space science and technology.2)
But the Eisenhower administration didn’t immediately respond to the shock.
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Johnson, as majority leader and chairman of the preparedness subcommittee of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, called for a raise in the budget for space and
missiles. As the Democratic Party held a majority in both Houses of Congress, the
Eisenhower administration accelerated some ballistic missile programs and
established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the
National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC) in the fall of 1958.
On the other hand, Kennedy, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee,
advocated overcoming the two gaps from the standpoint of U.S. foreign policy. In
August 1958, Kennedy stated a grave situation of the missile gap, and took up the
“Sputnik diplomacy” as one of the threats to the United States in the following
speech before the Senate:
“The most critical years of the [missile] gap would appear to be
1960-1964. . . . Their missile power will be the shield from behind
which they will slowly, but surely, advance—through [S]putnik
diplomacy, limited brushfire wars, indirect nonviolent aggression,
intimidation and subversion, internal revolution, increased prestige
or influence, and the vicious blackmail of our allies.”3)
The Sputnik diplomacy was a propaganda campaign that Soviet Premier Nikita
S. Khrushchev had been carrying on to make people all over the world believe that
the military, economic and national power of the Soviet Union would be superior to
that of the United States, through the Soviet space achievements like Sputnik.
Kennedy felt keenly the necessity of taking countermeasures against Khrushchev’s
space diplomacy.
Kennedy and Johnson, who became famous through the disputes over the two
gaps, were nominated for presidential candidate and vice presidential candidate,
respectively, in the Democratic national convention of July 1960. Kennedy set out
the “New Frontier” policy for the buildup of national power and the progress of
society, in order to confront Richard M. Nixon, the Republican presidential
candidate. While Nixon insisted the achievements of Eisenhower’s space policy,
especially in the field of science and practical use, Kennedy asserted that “We are
in strategic space race with the Russians, and we are losing. . . . But we cannot run
second in this vital race.”4)
Finally in the 1960 campaign, Kennedy’s assertion that the United States should
close the gap and win space race with the Soviet Union seemed to be more
convincing than Nixon’s affirmation of the status quo. Kennedy beat Nixon by the
slim margin in the presidential election, and would be inaugurated as the 35th
President of the United States.
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The president-elect Kennedy asked Jerome B. Wiesner, Professor of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to investigate the present U.S. space
activities. On 10 January 1961, Wiesner submitted to Kennedy the “Report to the
President-Elect of the Ad Hoc Committee on Space.”5)  It emphasized national
prestige, national security, and international cooperation as the principal
motivations of space program, and concluded that “a crash program aimed at
placing a man into an orbit at the earliest possible time cannot be justified solely on
scientific or technical grounds.” As Kennedy and Johnson hoped for a new space
program which would be different from Eisenhower’s, the report did not
necessarily meet their expectation.6)  But Kennedy appointed him the Special
Assistant to the President and chairman of the President’s Science Advisory
Committee (PSAC) because Kennedy trusted him and the technical value of his
report.
Kennedy also reformed the National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC)
more functionally by designating Vice President Johnson as its chairman. But it
was in April 1961 when Johnson was formally appointed as chairman of NASC.
Moreover, it was in February 1961 when James B. Webb was appointed as new
NASA Administrator. Only Wiesner took office formally at the birth of the
Kennedy administration. In addition, Kennedy had seen space as an area for
international cooperation, as well as competition, even during the presidential
campaign.7) Thus, the space policy of the Kennedy administration started in line
with Wiesner’s view, the promotion of international cooperation in space activities.
In the inaugural address and the State of the Union Message of late January
1961, President Kennedy stated that the United States was ready to cooperate with
other countries, including the Soviet Union, in the field of weather prediction,
satellite communications, and planetary exploration.8)  He added that “both nations
[the United States and the Soviet Union] would help themselves as well as other
nations by removing these endeavors from the bitter and wasteful competition of
the Cold War.” Kennedy thought that the United States should advance
international cooperation in space activities while building up its power of space
science and technology.
Kennedy directed Wiesner to draw up the concrete plan for space cooperation,
and also started direct exchanges of opinions with Khrushchev about space
cooperation. Khrushchev replied to Kennedy that favorable conditions for space
cooperation “would be created through the settlement of the problem of
disarmament.”9)  Kennedy discussed the response with Wiesner. In his
memorandum to Kennedy, Wiesner recommended that the United States should
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advance such space programs not as to stimulate the space competition with the
Soviet Union but as to promote international space cooperation, display the richness
of the United States to international society, and ease international tensions.10)  This
was the main point of Wiesner’s cooperative-oriented space policy, and also the
first space policy of the Kennedy administration.
At the meeting about the NASA supplementary budget on 22-23 March 1961,
the Kennedy administration decided to accelerate the large booster program, Project
Saturn, and not to start an advanced human spaceflight program, Project Apollo, for
the following two reasons.11)  First, as the first human spaceflight of Project
Mercury was slated for the next month, Kennedy and his space advisors wanted to
make a judgment after the flight. Second, the Kennedy administration was under
the pressure to deal with the problems in the third world at that time. The East-West
tensions were running high in Congo, Laos, and Cuba. Therefore it was conceivable
that the space policy of the Kennedy administration bore its role of easing the
tensions by pursuing international cooperation.
Thus the Kennedy administration started the space policy for not only
strengthening of the U.S. space science and technology power but also promoting
international cooperation. It was rather far from Kennedy’s remarks on the space
race with the Soviet Union in the 1960 presidential election.
The Decision to Go to the Moon12)
In early April 1961, Kennedy was told that the Soviet Union might carry on the
first human spaceflight soon. But the Kennedy administration had little sense of
competition with the Soviet Union in realizing the first human spaceflight, like the
Eisenhower administration in launching the first satellite. As expected, the Soviet
Union succeeded in putting Yuri A. Gagarin aboard Vostok 1 into the Earth orbit on
12 April 1961. Khrushchev propagandized extensively the achievement, as he had
done following Sputnik 1, as the evidence of the further development of the Soviet
socialism. The Kennedy administration tasted defeat, as the Eisenhower
administration did, in the psychological and political space competition with the
Soviet Union, although the United States was not behind in the purely scientific
space competition. To the United States, this became the “Gagarin shock”
following the “Sputnik shock.”
Nevertheless, Kennedy and NASA took careful response to the shock, although
the administration recognized that the United States should accelerate or change its
space programs and began to consider some kinds of human lunar exploration.
Kennedy thought that he wouldn’t be made to bear the responsibility because only
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three months had passed since the start of the Kennedy administration. On the other
hand, NASA was steadily preparing for the U.S. first human spaceflight.
Immediately after the Gagarin shock, however, another shock attacked the Kennedy
administration.
The Kennedy administration had been tackling the third world policy since the
start. In January 1959, the revolution led by Fidel Castro broke out in Cuba and the
Castro administration was born. The Eisenhower administration ordered the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to draw up the plan to overthrow the Castro
administration, which strengthened its dependence on the Soviet Union. When the
preparation was completed, the U.S. government changed to Kennedy from
Eisenhower. While Allen W. Dulles, Director of CIA, pressed Kennedy to order to
begin the operations, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant to the President,
and Democratic Senator J. William Fulbright firmly opposed them.
After all, Kennedy took a compromise plan to execute the operations not under
the name of the United States. Cuban refugees given military training in the United
States started to invade the Bay of Pigs in Cuba on 15 April 1961, three days after
Gagarin’s flight. But the invasion ended soon in complete failure because the
Castro administration had made thoroughgoing preparations for it. To the Kennedy
administration, this failure became the “Bay of Pigs shock,” following the Gagarin
shock.
Did the Bay of Pigs shock influence the formulation of a new space program,
Project Apollo? It seemed to be “never explicitly linked to the acceleration of the
space program.”13)  But McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, says
that “it is quite possible, if the Bay of Pigs had been a resounding success, the
President might have dawdled a little longer on the space decision.”14)  Schlesinger
also writes that the President tried “to divert the demand of action against Castro
into a general strengthening of American purpose.”15)
Therefore, it should be stated that the Bay of Pigs shock hastened the decision
on a new space program, and made it bear more part of the U.S. foreign policy that
could build a new peaceful framework in the Cold War. The Kennedy administra-
tion started to formulate a new space program in order to overcome dramatically
both the “Gagarin shock” and the “Bay of Pigs shock.”
Kennedy first ordered Johnson to investigate the present U.S. space activities
and propose a new space program to beat the Soviet Union, when Johnson was
formally appointed as chairman of NASC on 20 April 1961. While he was drawing
together various opinions within the government, Congress, and communities of
space specialists by his own personal network, Johnson held two large meetings to
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discuss a new space program.16)  One was for the discussion about its technological
possibility with NASA, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Bureau of the
Budget (BOB) on 24 April. The other was for the discussion about its political
possibility with Congressmen on 3 May. Through these meetings, Johnson mostly
completed the consensus-building to decide on a new space program, which would
realize the first human lunar landing.
On 5 May, Alan B. Shepard, Jr. succeeded in the first U.S. human suborbital
flight aboard the Mercury spacecraft Freedom 7. The flight swept away uneasiness
and doubt over the human spaceflight programs in the United States. On 8 May,
NASA Administrator Webb and Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense,
submitted to Kennedy the report, “Recommendations for Our National Space
Program: Changes, Policies, Goals.” It stated that:
“This nation needs to make a positive decision to pursue space
projects aimed at enhancing national prestige. Our attainments are
a major element in the international competition between the Soviet
system and our own. The non-military, non-commercial, non-
scientific but ‘civilian’ projects such as lunar and planetary explora-
tion are, in this sense, part of the battle along the fluid front of the
cold war.”17)
Kennedy held a meeting to examine the recommendations on 10 May. There the
Kennedy administration finally decided on Project Apollo which would realize the
first human lunar landing during the 1960s.18)
In parallel with the deliberation of Project Apollo, the Kennedy administration
was pressed to make a decision whether Kennedy should hold the first summit
meeting with Khrushchev on that occasion. Originally in late February 1961,
Kennedy proposed it to Khrushchev, and Khrushchev agreed to it in late April, after
the two shocks. Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, coordinated the agenda of
the summit in back channel with Georgi Bolshakov, an intelligent attaché of the
Soviet Embassy in Washington.19)  On 16 May, Kennedy received not only an
acceptance letter from Khrushchev about the summit in Vienna, but also the report
of the U.S.-Soviet space cooperation plan from Wiesner.20)  Although the report had
been finished in April, Wiesner had no chance to submit it to Kennedy because of
the two shocks. Kennedy himself could not figure out how Project Apollo should be
announced in view of its vast cost and influence on the U.S.-Soviet relations. Thus,
he decided to search for the best way by sounding out the possibility of the U.S.-
Soviet space cooperation including Project Apollo.21)
Kennedy directed Robert Kennedy and Dean Rusk, Secretary of States, to
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propose U.S.-Soviet space cooperation to the Soviet Union. Rusk talked with
Andrei A Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister, on 20 May, and Robert Kennedy met
Bolshakov on 21, 23, and 24 May. But in the preparatory negotiations, Kennedy
reached a conclusion that the Soviet Union had no intention to create any agreement
on the issues, including space cooperation, and underestimated the intention and
power of the United States. Kennedy made up his mind to announce Project Apollo
as a new national policy to clearly demonstrate the U.S. confrontational stance to
the Soviet Union in the Cold War.
On 25 May 1961, Kennedy proposed Project Apollo in the following speech
titled the “Urgent National Needs” as the second State of the Union Message:
“I believe that this Nation should commit itself to achieving the
goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and
returning him safely to earth. . . . But in a very real sense, it will not
be one man going to the moon—it will be an entire nation. For all
of us must work to put him there.”22)
Although the United States only succeeded in the first suborbital flight, the
announcement of Project Apollo gave a great surprise to American people as well
as all over the world. Thanks to Johnson’s consensus-building, the proposal and the
additional funding needed to get started were passed by an overwhelming majority
in both Houses of Congress. By Kennedy’s speech and their swift passing, Kennedy
could impress strongly his leadership on the U.S. domestic society, and the
Kennedy administration could take the first step to recover the international status
of the United States.
Thus the two shocks, Gagarin and the Bay of Pigs, made the Kennedy
administration to completely reverse its space policy for international cooperation.
Still in fact, the Kennedy administration also continued to search a way to
cooperate the Soviet Union in space activities, including Project Apollo.
The Evolution of U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation
Kennedy left for Vienna to meet Khrushchev right after the announcement of
Project Apollo. The main subjects of the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting were Berlin,
Laos, and nuclear test ban problems. But in the tense discussions, Kennedy
proposed the U.S.-Soviet joint lunar program on the first day of the summit, 3 June
1961. Khrushchev accepted it once, but on the next day he declined it because of
disarmament problems.23)
Yet Kennedy felt that Khrushchev wasn’t so stimulated by the announcement of
Project Apollo, and also found a political and diplomatic value in pursuing the
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realization of the U.S.-Soviet space cooperation. Before the summit, Kennedy had
been concerned that Project Apollo would make the U.S.-Soviet space competition
too intense and also the U.S.-Soviet relations worse. That was why Kennedy
proposed the joint lunar program. After that, Kennedy advanced Project Apollo to
beat the Soviet Union, but at the same time he sought out international space
cooperation to make better U.S.-Soviet relations.
At the 16th UN General Assembly of 25 September 1961, Kennedy proposed
“reserving outer space for peaceful use, prohibiting weapons of mass destruction in
space or on celestial bodies, and opening the mysteries and benefits of space to
every nation,” by referring to international space cooperation in weather prediction
and communications satellites.24)  It led to the UN General Assembly Resolution
1721 (XVI), “International Cooperation in Peaceful Use of Outer Space,” because
the Soviet Union joined the meetings of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS) for the first time.25)  This meant that the Soviet Union
might discuss international space cooperation with the United States, independently
of disarmament problems.
On 21 February 1962, John H. Glenn succeeded in the first U.S. orbital flight
aboard the Mercury spacecraft Friendship 7. Khrushchev sent to Kennedy a
message of congratulations that:
“If our countries pooled their efforts—scientific, technical and
material—to master the universe, this would be very beneficial for
the advance of science and would be joyful acclaimed by all
peoples who would like to see scientific achievements benefit man
and not be used for ‘cold war’ purposes and the arms race.”26)
Judging this message to be a good opportunity to realize space cooperation,
Kennedy replied that:
“I welcome your statement that our countries should cooperate in
the exploration of space. I have long held this same belief and
indeed put it forward strongly in my first State of the Union
message. . . . I am instructing the appropriate officers of this
Government to prepare new and concrete proposals for immediate
projects of common action, and I hope that at a very early date our
representatives may meet to discuss our ideas and yours in a spirit
of practical cooperation.”27)
Thus the bilateral talks concerning space cooperation started, and they reached
the preliminary agreement on the cooperation in the field of meteorological
satellites, communications satellites and geomagnetic research on 8 June 1962.28)
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The negotiations continued even in the middle of the Cuban missile crisis and they
worked out a final agreement in August 1963. Furthermore, they led to the
possibility of the U.S.-Soviet joint lunar program.
On the other hand, Kennedy continued to insist that the United States should
carry through Project Apollo to be the world leader. He made the following speech
at Rice University in Houston, Texas on 12 September 1962:
“The exploration of space will go ahead, whether we join in it or
not, and it is one of the great adventures of all time, and no nation
which expects to be the leader of other nations can expect to stay
behind in this race for space. . . . We choose to go to the moon. We
choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things, not
because they are easy, but because they are hard, . . . ”29)
Right after this speech, the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 had two
contradictory effects on the space policy of the Kennedy administration.30) First, it
made Kennedy recognize again the importance of the U.S. space science and
technology power. At the meeting of 21 November, just after the Cuban crisis,
NASA Administrator Webb asserted that the United States “might not have been as
successful on Cuba if we hadn’t flown John Glenn and demonstrated we had a real
overall technical capability here.”31)  Kennedy answered that “We agree. That’s
why we wanna put this program [Project Apollo]. . . . That’s the dramatic evidence
that we’re preeminent in space.”32)  The Cuban crisis strengthened Kennedy’s
conviction that the United States should implement Project Apollo, which the
“highest (DX) national priority” was assigned to in the spring of 1962, to develop
U.S. space power.33)
But the Cuban crisis also made Kennedy feel acutely the need for the easing of
the East-West tensions. To improve the U.S.-Soviet relations, the Kennedy
administration continued the negotiations on space science cooperation with the
Soviet Union. After the Cuban crisis, the Kennedy administration pursued further
both space competition, by Project Apollo, and space cooperation, by space science,
with the Soviet Union.
Something serious to Project Apollo happened in July 1963. British astronomer
Sir Bernard Lovell, who came back from a trip to Soviet space facilities, reported
that the Soviet Union had no human lunar landing program, and rather was willing
to cooperate with the United States and other countries in moon exploration.34)
Kennedy seemed to be upset about the information, and he couldn’t make a
decision immediately though he had proposed the U.S.-Soviet joint lunar project
before.35)
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As international tensions had eased after the Cuban crisis, the Limited Test Ban
Treaty (LTBT) was concluded on 5 August 1963. The expectations for international
peace were turned on the 18th UN General Assembly of the next month. Kennedy
intended to have refereed to the ratification of LTBT by U.S. Congress, but it was
behind schedule. Accordingly, the proposal of the U.S.-Soviet joint lunar program
came up as a subject of his speech.36)
Two Special Assistants for the President, Schlesinger and Bundy, made
preparations for Kennedy’s speech on the joint lunar program for the two reasons.
First, the proposal would be appropriate to the UN General Assembly because it
would create a peaceful framework in the Cold War. Second, such criticisms of
Project Apollo as the “moondoggle” or the “science fiction stunt” were increasing
year by year. The U.S.-Soviet space cooperation would lighten the burden of NASA
and DOD in view of budget and organization. But, compared with the
announcement of Project Apollo in May 1961, Kennedy and space advisors had no
time to build the consensus within the government, Congress, and communities of
space specialists.
On 20 September 1963, Kennedy proposed the U.S.-Soviet joint lunar program
in the following speech before the UN General Assembly:
“Finally, in a field where the United States and the Soviet Union
have a special capacity—in the field of space—there is room for
new cooperation, for further joint efforts in the regulation and
exploration of space. I include among these possibilities a joint
expedition to the moon. Space offers no problems of sovereignty. . . .
Surely we should explore whether the scientists and astronauts of
our two countries—indeed of all the world—cannot work together
in the conquest of space, sending some day in this decade to the
moon not the representatives of a single nation, but the
representatives of all of our countries.”37)
This proposal brought surprise and confusion to the U.S. domestic society. On
17 September, three days before the proposal, Robert Gilruth, Director of NASA
Manned Spacecraft Center, made a statement that the U.S.-Soviet joint lunar
program would be difficult technically. The argument became heated in Congress.
The supporters of Project Apollo lost the main purpose of beating the Soviet Union
in the moon race. Democratic Representatives Albert Thomas and Olin E. Teague
sent letters of protest to the President. Kennedy replied that “This great national
effort [Project Apollo] and this steadily stated readiness to cooperate with others are
not in conflict. They are mutually supporting elements of a single policy.”38)  This
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showed the basic stance of the Kennedy administration in space policy, but couldn’t
persuade the Apollo supporters.
On the other hand, the opponents of Project Apollo got the suitable chance to
stop it. Through the efforts of Republican Representative Thomas M. Pelly, the
restriction to prohibit cooperation on a lunar program with any other country
without the consent of Congress was included in the NASA appropriation for the
next three years.39)
Outside the United States, while European countries were relatively favorable to
Kennedy’s proposal, the Soviet Union assumed an ambiguous attitude toward it.
But on 26 October 1963, Khrushchev stated at his press conference that “We are
not at present planning flight by cosmonauts to the moon. . . . We do not want to
compete with the sending of people to the moon without careful preparation.”40)
This statement plunged Project Apollo into a crisis. U.S. Congress started to
examine the slowdown of Project Apollo and review the whole U.S. space
programs. Wiesner sent to Kennedy the memorandum titled “The US Proposal for a
Joint US-USSR Lunar Program” that:
“I believe that Premier Khrushchev’s statement of October 26 that
the USSR does not plan to land a man on the moon gives us a
unique opportunity to follow through on your UN proposal for a
joint US-USSR program. . . . Specifically, I would propose a joint
program in which the USSR provides unmanned exploratory and
logistic support for the U.S. Apollo manned landing. . . . The
proposal now not only offers a program which truly enhances the
manned lunar exploration effort while leaving the Apollo program
intact, but also one which ought to be acceptable to the USSR. . . . If
the proposal is accepted we will have established a practical basis
for cooperative program. If it is rejected we will have demonstrated
our desire for peaceful cooperation and the sincerity of our original
proposal.”41)
Accepting Wiesner’s proposal, Kennedy ordered NASA to prepare a specific
plan along the line on 12 November.42)  But Kennedy fell to an assassin’s bullet in
Dallas, Texas on 22 November 1963. The news of his assassination was
broadcasted live on TV to Japan by the U.S. communications satellite Relay 1.
None other than Kennedy had been doing his best to realize the international
network by communications satellites as early as possible.
If Kennedy had been not assassinated, Khrushchev might have accepted
Kennedy’s specific proposal and the U.S.-Soviet joint moon landing would have
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been realized somehow or other. It was reported that Khrushchev was never
particularly interested in competing with Apollo.43)  However, the Soviet Union
began its own human lunar landing program only in August 1964, and Khrushchev
was dismissed from Chairman’s post in October of the same year. Eventually, the
United States advanced Project Apollo by competing with the Soviet Union and
succeeded in the first human moon landing by the spacecraft Apollo 11 on 20 July
1969.
Conclusion
The Kennedy administration chose Project Apollo as a crucial national policy
that would bear part of the U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War, and advanced it on
some occasions to win space competition with the Soviet Union, on others to
realize space cooperation with the Soviet Union.
John F. Kennedy won the 1960 presidential election by taking a confrontational
stance toward Khrushchev’s Sputnik diplomacy. However, the Kennedy
administration formulated the space policy for international cooperation in the first
months of his administration in order to relieve the East-West tensions, especially
in the third world. But in April 1961, the Kennedy administration suffered the two
shocks, the “Gagarin shock” and the “Bay of Pigs shock.” These fiascos in U.S.
foreign policy made the Kennedy administration decide swiftly on Project Apollo in
May 1961.
This decision and Kennedy’s remarks on U.S.-Soviet space race have convinced
us that the purpose of Project Apollo was to win space competition with the Soviet
Union. However, even right before the announcement of Project Apollo, the
Kennedy administration also tried to realize some U.S.-Soviet space cooperation
including human lunar exploration. In the Vienna summit of June 1961, Kennedy
proposed U.S.-Soviet joint lunar exploration for fear that Project Apollo should
have a bad influence on U.S.-Soviet relations. After the UN resolution for
international space cooperation of December 1961, the Kennedy administration
started negotiations with the Soviet Union about space science cooperation with the
Glenn’s flight of February 1962 as an opportunity, while the administration was
advancing Project Apollo.
The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 made the Kennedy administration
recognize the importance of both international cooperation and competition through
space policy. While Kennedy made up his mind to proceed firmly with Project
Apollo to compete with the Soviet Union, he continued the negotiations with the
Soviet Union about space science cooperation.
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Because of the cooperative atmosphere right after the conclusion of LTBT and
the increasing criticism toward the huge cost of Project Apollo, Kennedy proposed
U.S.-Soviet space cooperation through Project Apollo itself, not only in space
science, in the UN General Assembly of September 1963. Although the credibility
and feasibility of Kennedy’s proposal came into question, the Kennedy
administration had devoted effort to the realization of U.S.-Soviet joint lunar
landing until the assassination of Kennedy. Therefore, if the Kennedy
administration had continued during the 1960s, the U.S.-Soviet joint lunar program
might have developed in some way.
Thus, the Kennedy administration kept advancing Project Apollo by laying
emphasis on competition or cooperation in accordance with the change of U.S.-
Soviet relations. This shows that the purpose of Project Apollo was not only to
compete or cooperate with the Soviet Union in space activities. What did the
Kennedy administration aim at through Project Apollo? As the previous studies
have clarified, the administration tried to display the national power and ideas, or
values, of the United States, and regain both the international status of the United
States and the domestic status of the Kennedy administration. This purpose could
be accomplished not only by winning the victory in space competition but also by
demonstrating the leadership in space cooperation.
However, if the display of the U.S. power and ideas had been the only purpose
of Project Apollo, why had the Kennedy administration prepared for U.S.-Soviet
space cooperation concretely and repeatedly through the term of the Kennedy
administration?
The concept of the foreign policy of the Kennedy administration was to first
contain the expansion of the Communism bloc by the maintenance of the U.S. great
military strength, negotiate with the Eastern leaders in quest of the common
interests, and finally ease international tensions by accumulating the practical
agreements between the East and the West. Also in space activities, the Kennedy
administration tried to improve the U.S. space science and technology power, and
Kennedy negotiated directly with Khrushchev on space cooperation. In short, the
Kennedy administration strived to relax the tensions in the Cold War through its
space policy including Project Apollo. The realization of U.S.-Soviet space
cooperation would contribute to the easing of international tensions. Even if the
full-scale space race to the moon kicked off, it would be rather desirable than
military conflicts in Europe or the third world.
Therefore, it should be concluded that not only the display of U.S. power and
ideas but also the relaxation of the tensions in the Cold War was the purpose of
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Project Apollo that was advanced by means of both competition and cooperation
with the Soviet Union. Though it was in 1969 when the United States realized the
first lunar landing through Project Apollo, the space policy of the Kennedy
administration, with Project Apollo as the central program, restored gradually the
U.S. international status, symbolized the relatively good relations between the
United States and the Soviet Union, and contributed to the opening of the peaceful
coexistence in the 1960s, especially after the Cuban missile crisis, with other
foreign policies of the administration.
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